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We advance an approach to logical contexts that grounds the claim 
that logic is a local matter: distinct contexts require distinct logics. 
The approach results from a concern about context individuation, and 
holds that a logic may be constitutive of a context or domain of 
application. We add a naturalistic component: distinct domains are 
more than mere technical curiosities; as intuitionistic mathematics 
testifies, some of the distinct forms of inference in different domains 
are actively pursued as legitimate fields of research in current 
mathematics, so, unless one is willing to revise the current scientific 
practice, generalism must go. The approach is advanced by 
discussing some tenets of a similar argument advanced by Shapiro, 
in the context of logic as models approach. In order to make our view 
more appealing, we reformulate a version of logic as models 
approach following naturalistic lines, and bring logic closer to the 
use of models in science. 
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Logical generalism, as the name suggests, is the thesis that logic is general. 
This is ambiguous in the same measure as the term ‘logic’ is: on the one 
hand, it may denote ‘logic’ as a discipline, on the other, it may denote 
‘logic’ as a specific system of logic. As Shapiro notes, 
 
Moreover, logic is ubiquitous. [...] there is a longstanding view, 
with a stellar pedigree, that logical consequence is topic 
neutral; it applies everywhere. Even if that is challenged, [...] it 
remains that every coherent perspective—every language, 
every form of life, every context—has a logic. (Shapiro 2014, 
165) 
 
Here, we shall not discuss whether logic, taken as a science, is general, or 
universal, or ubiquitous. Rather, we shall focus on the claim that logic is 
general when one considers distinct systems of logic attempting to capture 
the validity of inferences in natural language (the so-called ‘canonical 
application’; see Priest 2006, 196-197). Our claim, again, is that distinct 
systems are required and legitimate for distinct contexts, even when the 
field of application concerns inferences in natural language.  
 
One could complain about that way of framing the problem, which 
emphasizes the role of distinct systems of logic. It could be said that 
validity in distinct systems should not be confused with validity per se or 
validity tout court; certainly, the claim could go, distinct systems 
characterize distinct notions of the consequence relation, but that is not 
what is at stake in philosophical debates. Rather, what is being disputed is 
whether distinct notions of validity are legitimate, or correct. That is, the 
question is whether there are, out in the wild, different notions of validity 
that require distinct systems to be characterized, and of which these 
systems are said to give a correct/incorrect description (depending on the 
case).  
 
Now, although one could advance such an objection, our discussion will 
not presuppose that there is such a thing as validity per se, or validity tout 
court. However, as we shall see, there is a sense to be made of claims of 
distinct systems being correct for distinct contexts. Basically, the notion of 
correctness, as our proposal will characterize it, does not require 
correspondence of a theoretically described notion of validity with an 
independently existing notion of validity, out in the wild (this will be 
discussed latter). Furthermore, given that we can only characterize the 
distinct notions of validity that are in dispute in terms of some logical 
theory, using the logical apparatuses furnished by distinct systems, we 
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shall keep with our talk of distinct systems, and not talk in terms of validity 
per se. Certainly, much more could be said about the idea that logical 
correctness is related to the correspondence of a system of logic with an 
intuitive or pre-theoretical notion of validity, but this is enough as a 
warning to begin with. We shall avoid this notion in our discussion, given 
that a proper treatment of this problem would require a different route.  
 
With those points out of the way, let us proceed. Our next task is to attribute 
a more precise meaning to the idea that logical theories, or logical systems, 
can be claimed to be general or local. There are some claims advanced to 
that purpose, although none of them provides a precise characterization 
that could be adopted as an official definition. As Routley (1980, 83) has 
advanced the claim of generalism, approvingly, what lies behind the 
generalist thesis is a worry about the scope of logic, the fact that “[l]ogic 
is not merely a local matter, and should, insofar as it is correct, apply 
universally.” Notice that this connects correction and generality. The 
opposite of generalism, a form of localism, may be understood then as the 
claim that logic is a local matter; a logic may be correct only locally. 
 
Some opponents of logical generalism go in the same direction when it 
comes to characterizing the core of the generalist thesis. Wyatt and Payette 
(2021, 4813), for example, characterize generalism as the claim according 
to which “logical systems and logical laws must have universal 
application”. Dicher (Forthcoming, 2), also not a defender of generalism, 
characterizes generalism as consisting of the view that, on what concerns 
logic, “there are no exceptions to its laws, which apply across every 
domain of inquiry, irrespective of the particular features of that domain”. 
Again, the most important feature of generalism concerns the claim that 
logic meets no borders; a system must have its inferences and validities 
applying in every context. Logic would be local, then, if its laws would 
have local applicability or validity, if distinct systems were required to 
account for distinct domains. Hjortland (2013, 356) frames the localist 
claim in terms of the existence of at least two domains of discourse for 
which correct deductive reasoning requires distinct logics.  
 
What these characterizations have in common, together with the discussion 
on generalism is, the idea of a context, or a domain, along with the claim 
that logic must be correct, or applied properly, irrespective of the context, 
or domain. Generalism involves the claim that a logical theory applies in 
every context or domain, it is insensitive to the demands of each particular 
domain it may meet. The individuation of a domain, then, is granted 
independently of the underlying logic; that is, according to generalism, in 
specifying a domain or context, the underlying logic is taken for granted 
(given that it is universal, context-independent), and each domain builds 
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over it with its specific features (the context-depend ones). According to 
generalism, what is common to all domains or contexts is the underlying 
logic. 
 
Notice that one may regard that only one system of logic fits the bill of 
being general enough, of accounting for every domain, resulting in a 
monist position about logic, or else one may hold that distinct systems of 
logic are all equally successful in being general as required, resulting in 
pluralism about logic. The distinction general/local does not collapse into 
the distinction monism/pluralism, although it is much more common to 
find monists among generalists than pluralists. For localists, those that hold 
that distinct logics may be correct or appropriate for distinct contexts, the 
same distinction applies. Given a context, one may believe that only one 
system of logic is correct for that context (local monism, a position 
defended by da Costa 1997), or that a whole family of distinct systems may 
be equally correct for that context (local pluralism, a position defended by 
Bueno 2002, for instance).  
 
The terminology thus introduced requires that we distinguish between the 
pair local/general on the one hand, and the pair one/many on the other, 
when it comes to logic. 1  Their combinations give rise to the current 
spectrum of traditional positions: logical monism and logical pluralism, as 
traditionally understood, are generalist theses, holding that there is one and 
that there are many correct logics, respectively. Relativism or localism is 
the thesis that logic is local, and the question remains open as to whether 
there are many distinct logics for one context, or only one for each context.  
 
In this paper, we shall focus on the general/local divide, leaving the issue 
of one/many for another occasion. Our plan is to elaborate over already 
existing proposals for logical relativism, and we do so by putting logic in 
a naturalistic setting in two related senses. First of all, naturalism is 
understood as the methodological claim that there is no first philosophy to 
judge science, with logic and mathematics understood as part of science. 
Second, the approach advanced here is naturalist also in the way that the 
‘logic as models’ approach is framed, requiring that models be understood 
in closer connection to the workings of models in science; more 
specifically, we shall suggest that the understanding of models in science 
according to the view called ‘models as epistemic tools’, as developed by 
Knuuttila and Boon (2011), can be fruitfully adapted to the case of logic. 
This will provide us the appropriate understanding of ‘context’ required to 
motivate localism in logic. As we shall see, logical generalism is not 
 
1 This clearly complements the distinction advanced by Haack (1978, 223) and, following Haack, by  
Hjortland (2013, 356-357). 
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motivated, if an account of logic that is more naturalistic is adopted, and 
when the notion of a context is properly understood in connection to 
scientific modeling. In order to motivate our proposal, we shall briefly 
discuss a related argument advanced by Shapiro (2014), who also defends 
the logic as models approach. We shall use what appear to be some 
tensions in Shapiro’s approach to suggest an alternative account that not 
only overcomes the difficulties, but also presents some virtues that 
recommend it as a better option for the friends of the logic as models 
approach. As a kind of bonus, we hope, the resulting combination of 
naturalism and ‘logic as models’, as developed here, can be used to 
articulate a version of logical anti-exceptionalism; according to the latter, 
logic is continuous with empirical science in many respects (see Hjortland 
2017). Perhaps, the view defended here does contribute to substantiate this 
claim, although we shall not develop it here. 
 
Perhaps one more word on the pluralism/monism divide is in order. 
Typically, this is directly connected with the question of whether one or 
many logics are correct, and the problem of the correction of a logic is a 
substantial one, concerning connection of the formal systems with extra-
systematic considerations about validity (see Haack 1978, chapter 2). As 
we shall propose in the paper, due to the kind of approach to logical 
contexts we advance, the ‘correct’ logic for a context becomes somehow 
an a priori issue, not open for substantial dispute (of course, the topic is 
developed in the paper). The locus of dispute, due to the naturalistic 
approach to the epistemology of logic and theory choice shifts, then, to the 
dispute on whether it is one or many logics that are currently required by 
the scientific community in its investigative practice. In this sense, the 
debate resembles the ‘monism versus pluralism’ debate, but the locus of 
importance is shifted, given that the issue of correction of a logic is mostly 
deflated. Developing this difference in depth would require a different 
paper, so that we just leave this as reminder for the reader. For those willing 
to keep the terminology, the view defended here would be classified as a 
form of local pluralism, although, again, the ‘pluralism versus monism’ 
debate is typically framed in terms that are considerably different from the 
one presented in the current paper. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we 
advance Shapiro’s argument against generalism, in the context of his 
approach to logic as models. In section 3, we present what may look like 
some difficulties for the strategy employed by Shapiro, and in particular, 
his understanding of the role of logic when it is considered under the logic 
as models approach. Our own suggestion arises as a solution to overcome 
the mentioned difficulties, and comes from a twist to Shapiro’s 
perspectives. We argue that it combines perfectly with a more science-
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friendly approach to models in science in general, known in the 
philosophical literature as the ‘logic as epistemic tools’ approach. We 
conclude in section 5.  
 
 
2. Shapiro’s approach 
 
We start by presenting Shapiro’s approach against logical generalism. As 
we understand it, it requires Shapiro’s account of logic as per the logic as 
a model approach as a starting point. Basically, Shapiro holds that systems 
of logic are to be understood as models of inferences in natural language, 
in what is regarded as the same sense that ‘model’ is understood and 
employed in the sciences. This holds explicitly for formal languages: 
 
I propose that a formal language is a mathematical model of a 
natural language in roughly the same sense as, say, a collection 
of point masses is a model of a system of physical objects, and 
a Turing machine is a mathematical model of a person 
following an algorithm, or perhaps a computing device. In 
other words, a formal language displays certain features of 
natural languages, while ignoring, simplifying, or idealizing 
other features [...]. (Shapiro 2014, 46) 
 
Besides language, the modeling account also deals with the notion of 
logical consequence. The similarities of use of mathematical models in 
logic with the understanding of how models are used in other areas of 
investigation results in the question of the correctness of systems of logic 
being largely relative to our specific purposes, and to the accompanying 
claim that their success should be evaluated accordingly. As Shapiro 
claims: 
 
With mathematical models, which features one focuses on, 
which are idealized, and which are ignored, depends on the 
purposes at hand, on why one is developing a model in the first 
place. Here, of course, our goal is to shed light on the relation 
(or relations) of logical consequence, and perhaps the norms 
for deductive reasoning and regulating beliefs to maintain 
consistency. So, presumably, in developing a logic-model, we 
should focus on and idealize those features of natural language 
that bear on deductive reasoning, or on regulating our beliefs 








This opens the door for arguing that distinct logics may be appropriate for 
distinct fields or contexts, given that we may have different purposes in 
different contexts. Indeed, this is the crucial ingredient for the kind of 
argument that Shapiro will advance for the relative character of logic. In 
order to do so, Shapiro couples this view on logic with a form of 
Hilbertianism on the philosophy of mathematics. Basically, this is an 
update on Hilbert’s motto according to which, roughly speaking, 
consistency implies existence. That is, a mathematical structure that is 
consistent implicitly defines the entities it deals with, just as in Euclidean 
geometry the notion of point is defined implicitly by the geometrical 
axioms for ‘point’. Given, however, that consistency is a matter of which 
logic one uses, and that distinct mathematical structures will end up being 
inconsistent when certain logics are adopted as their underlying logic, the 
result is that given our purpose of preserving consistency, perhaps distinct 
logics are required to account for the perceived consistency of distinct 
mathematical structures. 
 
Notice how the dialectics to ensure relativism goes. First, it is assumed that 
a kind of mathematical pluralism holds. This means that distinct kinds of 
mathematical structures are legitimate due to their consistency and to their 
actual interest for mathematicians. As a second step, given this plurality, 
we may inquire over which logics are required to make such mathematical 
theories consistent, or, in other words, for which are the appropriate 
underlying logics of such theories. If it happens that distinct mathematical 
theories require distinct logics, then we are justified in adopting a form of 
localism about logic, that is, that distinct logics apply in distinct domains 
or contexts (Shapiro calls this relativism). Here, the logic as models 
approach is playing a major role: given the diversity of mathematical 
structures taken as legitimate as a kind of point of departure, or as a kind 
of ‘neutral’ data that appears to be independent of the issue of which logic 
or logics are appropriate, we idealize the inferential practices of existing 
distinct mathematical theories in order to comply with the demands of 
consistency in each case. The result, as claimed, is that distinct theories 
will end up requiring distinct logics if their internal consistency is to be 
preserved. 
 
The case for the general argument is made with an illustration employing 
intuitionistic mathematics. As it is well-known, intuitionistic theories 
conflict with classical mathematics, and this conflict concerns the 
inferences available in each case (see Shapiro 2014, chapter 3, for specific 
examples concerning intuitionistic theories: Peano arithmetic using 
intuitionistic logic plus Church’s thesis (PA+CT), the intuitionistic 
analysis, and smooth infinitesimal analysis (SIA)). Let’s focus on the 
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simple case of intuitionistic analysis. In classical analysis, developed using 
classical logic, it is possible to define real functions that are not continuous 
(this is widely known, of course). Intuitionistic analysis does not vindicate 
such a simple fact, and this surprises students of classical mathematics 
when they hear of it for the first time. How can that be? This is a direct 
result of the theory of real numbers adopted by intuitionists.  
 
One of the sources for the difference is to be found in the very concept of 
real number in intuitionistic analysis. Indeed, the intuitionist may consider 
a real number as an equivalence class of Cauchy sequences of rational 
numbers, just as a classical mathematician does. However, a sequence, in 
this context, is a choice sequence, it is only potentially infinite, never 
complete (intuitionists do not accept complete infinities, remember). 
Recall that a sequence s of rational numbers is Cauchy if for every rational 
number ε > 0, there is a natural number N, so that for every natural numbers 
m > N and n > N, |s(n) – s(m)| < ε (intuitively, the terms of the sequence s 
may be seen as approaching each other, as the function picks as arguments 
numbers standing after a given N in the usual order). For an intuitionist, 
given any ε, if a sequence is Cauchy, one must be able to compute the N 
after which the members of the sequence are within the ε given. Over such 
a view of real numbers, we have: 
 
Brouwer’s theorem: all real functions defined over a closed 
interval are uniformly continuous.  
 
The details of the proof of the theorem need not concern us here. What is 
more relevant is that the result conflicts with classical analysis, and that 
Shapiro makes use of this fact to argue for the requirement of distinct logics 
for distinct mathematical structures. He argues that if we add the law of 
excluded middle to intuitionistic analysis, we are able to define functions 
that are not continuous. In this sense, then, Brouwer’s theorem holds only 
in the presence of restrictions to classical logic; it requires intuitionistic 
logic. Classical logic is not consistent with it. 
 
As a result, given that intuitionistic analysis is taken as a legitimate kind 
of mathematical structure (the initial data, recall) deserving to be 
developed and investigated, a kind of relativism about logic arises, due to 
the fact that distinct legitimate mathematical theories require distinct logics 
to be consistent (notice also the naturalistic bent, bringing mathematical 
practice to guide theory acceptability, rather than philosophical claims). 
The result is a restriction on the applicability of classical logic, as well as 
of intuitionistic logic. As Shapiro puts it: 
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conceding that the law of excluded middle, and thus classical 
logic, is not universally valid. That is, classical logic is not 
correct in all discourses, about all subject matters, etc. The 
intuitionist is right about that much. (Shapiro 2014, 82) 
 
That is, the conclusion is precisely a denial of generalism (given that 
Shapiro admits that excluded middle holds in classical analysis). Given that 
intuitionistic logic is required to account for part of that practice in 
intuitionistic analysis, it seems that intuitionistic logic is legitimate as the 
underlying logic of a domain of investigation. Of course, given that one is 
also assuming that classical structures require classical logic, then, distinct 
domains or contexts require distinct logics. This would justify rejection of 
the version of generalism we are concerned with. 
 
 
3. Some tensions for Shapiro’s account 
 
Although, as it will become clear, we are in agreement with the main 
conclusion established by Shapiro, we still seem to find some sources of 
tension that must be acknowledged in Shapiro’s path leading from 
Hilbertianism about mathematics to logical localism. In this section we 
shall bring some of them to the fore. Avoiding such tensions is the major 
goal of the approach we shall advance in the next section. 
 
The first source of concern is related to the requirement of consistency 
preservation as a sign for the appropriateness of a logic for a given context. 
That is, to recognize that a logic is appropriate for a given context, one is 
required to check whether that logic preserves or grants the context’s 
consistency (relative to that very same logic). Although it seems quite 
reasonable in the context of mathematical theories, the worry is that it may 
lead one to the wrong kind of account of the underlying logic in some quite 
interesting cases. There are historically well-known cases, such as Frege’s 
Grundgesetze, where choice of the underlying logic is out of the question, 
but still, the system is not consistent. Still, despite its inconsistency and 
triviality, the system is not without logical interest. Also, for a more recent 
episode, da Costa’s original formulation of his paraconsistent version of 
the set theory NF (New Foundations) was established as trivial, although 
there was no question of the choice of a logic (see da Costa 1986). Again, 
although the logic chosen by da Costa was not properly ensuring 
consistency (in this case, non-triviality), the system was clearly interesting, 
and had some important lessons to teach on the nature of paraconsistent set 
theory.  
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As a result, the requirement of consistency does not seem to provide, in 
some cases, at least, the best help when it comes to connecting systems of 
logic with specific contexts. Some legitimate mathematical contexts can 
be said to have well determined logics that clearly violate the requirement. 
In other words, some contexts come with a logic, explicitly formulated, 
that violate the requirement of consistency. In these cases, it does not seem 
appropriate to hold that the logic leading to inconsistency/triviality did not 
contribute to the individuation of each context. They did, but it ended up 
being the case that the systems were inconsistent/trivial. The very idea that 
one can attempt to fix Frege’s system, as neo-logicists do, or that da Costa 
could fix his system, only makes sense if we accept that the original system 
is and remain inconsistent/trivial. Accepting that the underlying logics help 
us characterize and individuate a context indicates that changing the 
underlying logic will result in a different theory (more on this soon).  
 
Perhaps one could object to this point in the following way: the cases 
brought here do not cause a problem to Shapiro, given that Shapiro is only 
concerned with what are considered legitimate mathematical structures, 
that is, consistent contexts really investigated by the mathematical 
community.  Being inconsistent, Frege’s Grundgesteze is not legitimate; 
being trivial, da Costa’s theory is not legitimate, and Shapiro would have 
nothing to do with them. However, it seems to us that this would limit the 
interest of Shapiro’s approach, missing interesting facts about the comings 
and goings of mathematical structures. For example, consider Cantor’s 
naive set theory. With the discovery of Russell’s paradox, the theory was 
fixed in a plurality of alternative ways, and interest in it did not disappear 
due to inconsistency. So, in a sense, it may happen that some theories are 
individuated with logics that do not grant them consistency, or non 
triviality. However, that does not mean that such theories cannot be 
interesting from a mathematical point of view. Rather, people try to keep 
some of the results of the theory either by changing the logic, or by 
changing some of the axioms specific to the theory (in both cases, with 
new contexts arising). That is, some theories may be on the radar of 
mathematicians even if they are inconsistent, and the search for a 
consistent version may be even a part of the pursuit of such 
mathematicians. 
 
The second perceived source of tension concerns the very idea of a context. 
Shapiro has offered the following characterization of a context:  
 
I propose that each “context” includes a specific mathematical 
theory or structure. It would be the mathematical theory being 
advanced at any given time by a mathematician or a group of 
mathematicians. In line with the foregoing eclectic orientation, 
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each such context has a specific logic: classical logic for the 
classical theories, intuitionistic logic for the intuitionistic ones, 
etc. Sometimes we will just think of a logic alone as a context, 
if the ambient mathematical theory is not in focus or does not 
matter. (Shapiro 2014, 89) 
 
However, in inferring from mathematical pluralism to logical localism, one 
must acknowledge that the adoption of distinct logics is a result of distinct 
contexts being already considered as legitimate, which in this case are the 
distinct mathematical theories currently investigated by the mathematical 
community. But distinct mathematical theories (which are playing the role 
of the contexts, here) seem to be characterized as incorporating a logic 
beforehand. That is, a logic is part of what constitutes and individuates a 
context. Under these conditions, it seems implausible to think that we can 
have a context (when this is a mathematical theory) individuated 
independently of a logic, only afterwards extracting from it a logic. 
Alternatively, we could proceed as Shapiro implies, seeing logics as 
models, and attempting to model the inference patterns of the context in 
each case where the context is legitimate in the eyes of the mathematicians. 
That is, logics are there to begin with, characterizing the context, but also, 
must be extracted from the context. So, the dilemma may be put as follows: 
on the one hand, the logic as models approach requires that we somehow 
idealize from given practices of inferences, generating a set of inferential 
patterns considered appropriate for the goal of preserving consistency in 
that context. On the other hand, a context is specified with the help of a 
logic. But then, we seem to be in trouble: logic must be already there to 
define a context, and also, be extracted from a context by the modeling 
procedure. It seems that we cannot have it both ways. 
 
Given that this issue is of central importance for our own argument against 
logical generalism, let us check what is going on in more detail. To 
motivate the failure of generalism, one must argue that distinct logics are 
required for distinct contexts. Shapiro attempts to grant that fact by starting 
with distinct mathematical theories that are playing the role of the contexts 
and provide a kind of neutral data on the issue of which logic is appropriate. 
Given these contexts, he proposes to somehow extract, by means of the 
modeling approach, the required logics that account for their consistency, 
by checking which system preserves the consistency of each mathematical 
theory. This would make a case for distinct logics in distinct contexts that 
is not question begging, and that confers credibility to the view, given that 
the distinct contexts one started with are scientifically respectable. 
However, when it comes to defining a context, systems of logic already 
play a role in their individuation. If this is really so, as it is suggested by 
the characterization of a context, then, one cannot really have a fully 
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convincing argument for the failure of generalism, given that such distinct 
logics were admitted as legitimate right from the start, with the claim that 
distinct mathematical theories constitute distinct contexts, and that such 
theories come with a logic. 
 
We can make the point quite forcefully considering Brouwer’s theorem, 
mentioned earlier. The fact that it is proved in intuitionistically acceptable 
ways already points to the need of identifying some logical resources, and 
that the law of excluded middle is not one of them. This should give us 
pause to think that perhaps intuitionistic logic (or something quite similar) 
must be available in the background beforehand, otherwise the context 
would be developed very differently. At least when it comes to 
mathematical theories, it is quite difficult to think that one could have some 
inferential practices in developing the theory that latter, under closer 
analysis, turn out to be intuitionistic logic, without consciously applying 
them in order to develop the mathematical context to begin with. In this 
sense, logic is required to characterize the context. However, as we have 
seen, the move by Shapiro also seems to require that logic is established 
after the context is available, by some kind of modeling activity. There lies 
the tension. 
 
One could hold that the tension is illusory.2 In fact, it can be argued that 
every context comes with an underlying logic L, but then, with the 
development of the theory, still inquire whether the theory is really 
consistent with L. It may turn out that it is, and that L is the best model for 
the kind of inference used in this context, or it may turn out that a distinct 
system of logic may be more adequate, resulting in the case that the logic 
discovered after the modeling process is applied, L’, is different from L, 
but still, more appropriate than L. This, it could be claimed, could make 
the use of an underlying logic to individuate a context compatible with the 
use of the logic as models approach to obtain a logic from the context, 
dispelling the kind of trouble that we have attempted to point out. But 
notice that this objection cannot dispel the worries we have raised. Given 
that a logic L is presented as the underlying logic for a context, it would be 
odd, to say the least, to discover, afterwards, that we did not properly infer 
according to it, so that the modeling process of our inferences ended up 
delivering a different logic. Why start with L, then, if we are not required 
to infer according to it? If it happens that the logic L leads us to triviality, 
such as in Frege’s Grundgesetze case, then, of course, we can only discover 
that by really using the logic L. This allows us to fix the context, in case it 
is of mathematical interest, originating new contexts (as discussed earlier 
also in the case of Cantor’s theory and paraconsistent set theory).  
 
2 Again, I owe the objection to an anonymous referee, to whom I would like to thank. 




As a result, we keep the claim that there is a tension in locating logic in the 
context to begin with, and also attempting to extract it from the context by 
use of the modeling approach. There are basically two views on the identity 
of context playing a major role here. On the one hand, a context is 
individuated by its underlying logic, so that the logic comes with the 
context. On the other hand, a context is given independently of a logic, so 
that the logic appropriate for the context is identified by a process of 
modeling of the inferential practices of users, restricted also to the demands 
of consistency. The argument from mathematical pluralism to logical 
localism depends on the latter view, it seems, because the plan is to infer 
the diversity of logics from the diversity of mathematics, by observing the 
demand of consistency.  
 
One can avoid the difficulty either by attempting to define ‘context’ 
without the use of logic as a constitutive component, which seems difficult 
in this circumstance, or by providing for another account leading from 
distinct contexts to the acceptability or correctness of distinct logics in such 
contexts. Our proposal consists in following the second route, and we shall 
see logics as contributing to the individuation of contexts in a more 
thoroughly naturalistic approach. 
 
 
4. Inverting the perspective 
 
In order to avoid the tension mentioned in the previous section, due to the 
very nature of a context, we shall acknowledge right from the start that 
systems of logic do act as (at least partially) constituting contexts. That is, 
in our view, a logical theory contributes actively to the individuation of a 
context; contrarily to what the generalist suggests, that a fixed logic is 
taken for granted, and that the specific contents of a context are added on 
the top of it, we allow that even a system of logic may be used to 
legitimately individuate a context. As we shall argue from now on, this has 
at least two main advantages: it avoids the problem of an apparent kind of 
circularity in justifying the use of a logic in a given context, and also the 
problem of deciding issues of the right logic for a context (without 
requiring that there is a notion of validity per se, as mentioned at the 
beginning of the paper). These issues are solved by the more flexible notion 
of context that we advance.  
 
It should be recognized that when it comes to mathematical theories, at 
least, logics are indeed part of the characterization of their respective 
contexts. To begin with the motivation for such a characterization of 
context, and the claim that it leads to localism quite directly, notice that 
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this will already make a better sense of the currently developing literature 
of inconsistent mathematics. Even though inconsistent mathematics does 
not enjoy (at least for now) the same kind of wide acceptance of 
intuitionistic and classical mathematics, it is a field that has been growing 
in recent years. Consider the following definition of inconsistent 
mathematics:  
 
Inconsistent mathematics is the study of the mathematical 
theories that result when classical mathematical axioms are 
asserted within the framework of a (non-classical) logic which 
can tolerate the presence of a contradiction without turning 
every sentence into a theorem. (Mortensen 2017) 
 
In other words, inconsistent mathematics are the mathematical theories 
developed over paraconsistent logics (see also Priest 2006, chapter 10 and 
the definition of inconsistent arithmetic). This defines a family of contexts 
in which paraconsistent logics are the correct logics, by fiat, as it were. 
Clearly, distinct kinds of paraconsistent structures require distinct kinds of 
paraconsistent logics, and the logic must be clearly specified right from the 
start. Now, if other contexts may be defined in the same way, and are 
considered legitimate by anyone in the dispute, then, there is a good case 
against the generalist.  
 
Before we proceed, notice how, in the case of inconsistent mathematics, 
such systems of logic are allowing us to individuate the contexts in 
question; inconsistent mathematics is defined as employing paraconsistent 
logics to begin with. In an important sense, there is no paraconsistent 
mathematics as a kind of activity first, and afterwards, we go on looking 
for the inferential patterns that enable such mathematics (that make it 
‘consistent’, meaning ‘non-trivial’ here). The direction suggested by 
Shapiro, of going from the mathematics to the logic, would hardly work 
here. Rather, without such logics there to begin with, there would not be a 
case for the existence and complete understanding of the identity of such 
contexts. In the case of mathematical contexts, the logics are assumed by 
default, and they are the correct logics for the specific contexts they help 
individuate to begin with. In the same sense, we suggest, it would be odd 
to have intuitionistic mathematicians, and classical mathematicians too, 
proving theorems, each in his or her own domain, and only afterwards 
looking for their specific inferential patterns, in order to investigate which 
logic is more suitable. The patterns codifying valid inferences are not there 
somewhat hidden, awaiting to be found by a posteriori modeling activity. 
Rather, they are set at the beginning, to individuate the context. The logics 
act as enabling the development of the kind of mathematics of which they 
are the underlying logics. 
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It is not the case, then, that distinct mathematical theories or structures 
make a case for the plausibility of the use of distinct logics; rather, distinct 
logics act to enable that distinct mathematics be developed. This solves the 
problem of determining the individuality of a context, avoiding what was 
perceived as a kind of circularity in the previous section. It puts the issue 
of the appropriate direction of the dependence of a context on logic on a 
clearer basis: the adoption of distinct logics is not a result of the acceptance 
of distinct mathematical structures as legitimate; rather, the distinct 
mathematical structures are a result of distinct approaches to logic, which 
act as a guide in the development of such mathematical structures. 
Although this may sound historically inaccurate in some cases, due to 
Brouwer’s distrust of logic in general, there is a case to be made for it, even 
on what concerns intuitionism. Recall that although Brouwer did not 
develop a system of intuitionistic logic, his own approach to constructive 
mathematics originates in great part from his distrust of classical logic, and 
on restrictions to classical inference modes. In fact, in order to characterize 
constructive mathematics, in general, one needs to appeal to the kind of 
inferences, or logical behavior that is the basis of such contexts:  
 
Constructive mathematics is distinguished from its traditional 
counterpart, classical mathematics, by the strict interpretation 
of the phrase “there exists” as “we can construct”. In order to 
work constructively, we need to re-interpret not only the 
existential quantifier but all the logical connectives and 
quantifiers as instructions on how to construct a proof of the 
statement involving these logical expressions. (Bridges and 
Palmgreen 2018) 
 
In this sense, just as inconsistent mathematics is mathematics developed 
over paraconsistent logics, constructive mathematics requires a 
constructive understanding of the logical apparatus to begin with; the logic 
contributes to the identity of the context. And we may go even further, and 
consider classical mathematics, which was here even before something like 
classical logic was available, right? How can it be that classical logic acts 
as enabling it? Well, notice that the epithet ‘classical’ was applied to 
classical mathematics only after classical logic consolidated. Classical 
logic is a recent invention, and a distinction between ‘classical’ 
mathematics and other types of mathematics is only available after the 
consolidation of classical logic. So, in this sense, the distinct logics and 
inference patterns required for distinct contexts, in the case of 
mathematical theories, are part of the very definition of a context, and are 
correct for those contexts due to this very fact.  
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But now, given that the localist thesis is no longer inferred from a given 
neutral data, the plurality of mathematical theories, how do we grant that 
distinct logics are required for distinct contexts? Or, in other terms: how 
do we grant that distinct logics are required for distinct contexts, and that 
they are correct for them? We need to separate two distinct issues that are 
conflated in this kind of question. One way of looking at the question is 
concerned with the correctness of a logic for a specific context. This, at 
least in the case of some mathematical theories, is solved by the 
appropriate, and more refined, notion of a context that we advanced. A 
logic is already employed when it comes to characterizing a context, and 
is the appropriate logic for that context. After defining contexts like that, 
right from the start there is a logic that is doing the work of being the 
underlying logic.  One could believe that this makes the issue of the correct 
logic rather uninteresting; in fact, this brings the disputes over the 
appropriate logic to a quick solution.3 However, although this may be seen 
as deflating some of the disputes over the correct logic, which may be seen 
as a virtue by some, it also shifts the locus of interest to another question: 
which such systems are interesting, or worthwhile pursuing? 
 
This is in fact the second question that is conflated with the previous one. 
It concerns the respectability, from a scientific point of view, of each such 
context that may be advanced for the consideration of the scientific 
community. Classical mathematics clearly has an upper hand here, given 
its long intellectual tradition and successful application to empirical 
sciences. But intuitionistic mathematics is also an institutionally 
recognized scientific research program. Anyone ruling one of such 
contexts out would be adopting a revisionist program of the philosophy of 
mathematics that does not account for the practice of the discipline in our 
days, and as such would have the burden of proof. 
 
This may be put in the context of the Carnapian principle of tolerance. The 
principle requires that we allow distinct systems to be investigated, and not 
to discard them based on philosophical prejudice. However, tolerance is 
still not enough to grant scientific respectability and ensure wide adoption 
of such systems in research programs. Tolerance concerns the fact that 
each one is free to advance a framework as something worth of pursuit; 
this, by itself, does not grant that the system will be pursued. Only science, 
as an institution, determines which systems (understood here as 
mathematical structures) are worth of investigation.4 Certainly, classical 
and intuitionistic mathematics pass this latter test. Given that each require 
 
3 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing that. 
4 Thus, logic and mathematics may also be seen as providing for research programs, in a Lakatosian 
sense, as suggested by Priest (1989). 
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a distinct logic, a form of logical localism in current mathematical practice 
seems to be vindicated. In this sense, then, generalism fails, because it 
cannot account for the current state of mathematics. One can be generalist 
only at the price of rejecting mathematical practice, which is possible, but 
not totally recommendable from a naturalistic point of view.  
 
The, in a sense, we suggest a division of labor between the question of 
correctness of a logic for a given context and the question of what makes 
a system an interesting object of research. In the picture suggested, 
although the question of correctness becomes deflated, there is still an issue 
of whether the diversity of systems available can become an integrating 
part of current scientific enterprise. From the relativist point of view 
advanced, a plurality of systems is justified in the measure that they are 
part of such an ongoing enterprise. As Caret proposed: 
 
An honest naturalist simply takes mathematics as it stands and 
respects the autonomy of the discipline, rather than imposing 
outside ideas about how it ‘should’ be practiced. Who are we 
to police the bounds of mathematics because of some hangup 
about bivalence or truth-tables? (Caret 2021, 4964) 
 
Such a practice recommends that some non-classical structures are 
currently part of the mathematical practice and this legitimates them. 
Notice that the issue of whether intuitionistic logic is correct for such 
practice is a prior issue (and here we differ from Caret); the point of 
relevance is accepting intuitionistic mathematics as part of the scientific 
enterprise. Again, this makes relativism interesting, the fact that it is 
anchored in the practice of science. 
 
Let us contrast this approach again with Shapiro’s strategy. While Shapiro 
uses the fact that our scientific community recognizes diverse 
mathematical structures as worthy of study and engagement as a starting 
point, which then leads to contexts and, from them, to distinct logics, we 
use logic as enabling the development of distinct mathematical theories, 
which, then, are acknowledged (or not) by our community as worthy of 
development (as fruitful research programs). That is, both approaches will 
have to appeal to the verdict of the scientific community on what concerns 
distinct mathematical structures and their scientific respectability as 
fruitful mathematical programs of research. However, while Shapiro uses 
this fact as a springboard to logical localism, attempting to ground the need 
for distinct logics in this fact, we use distinct logics to provide the very 
source of such distinct contexts. Scientific respectability comes after that, 
if it ever comes for some of the mathematical theories that are proposed. 
This describes perfectly well the situation of the inconsistent mathematics 
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program: this is clearly a program where it is known, beforehand, which 
logic is the underlying logic of the enterprise. What friends of 
paraconsistent mathematics claim is that such structures are also worth of 
investigation, that the mathematical community should also join the efforts 
of developing such structures, due to theoretical rewards to be expected. 
Whether the mathematical community will listen to the call, time will tell, 
but it is largely an issue concerning the practice of mathematics, not of 
choice of the appropriate logic.  
 
There are many advantages in reversing the approach to contexts as we 
have done. First, we have a clearer identity condition for contexts; 
mathematical theories are not entities awaiting for a logic to be attributed 
to them; rather, they are endowed from the start with prescriptions for the 
correct inferences. Second, this solves by default the issue that distinct 
logics are required for distinct contexts, basically, because the logic is 
already an  ingredient of the context. Third, it is compatible with a version 
of the tolerance principle in which distinct logics may be used (as they 
indeed are, as the case of paraconsistent mathematics attests) to advance 
different contexts, which are then developed in the hope that the 
community may somehow recognize their importance. 
 
The approach is very logic-oriented; it makes use of the fact that the very 
notion of ‘domain’ gets broadened with the rise of non-classical logics, and 
with the recognition that logics themselves may be used or required to 
characterize contexts. This allows for distinct logics being used in distinct 
contexts by fiat, something that could not be imagined when such distinct 
logics were not available. So, the anti-generalist has a somehow direct case 
once distinct logics are present to constitute distinct domains. The point is 
that the easy case can become also epistemically respectable when such 
contexts are also scientifically relevant, and this is what happens with the 
intuitionistic mathematics, for instance. This is as far as a naturalist would 
demand of justification for the distinct logics, that they be really part of 
current science, and is compatible with tolerance with the development of 
alternative approaches, which then will look for their place in the scientific 
enterprise.  
 
We can finish now with a short discussion about how the logic as models 
approach suits in the picture, once this new understanding of context is 
adopted. Recall that we have suggested that logics help individuate a 
domain, instead of first having a domain or context, and then looking for 
the logic. In this sense, recall, the proposal is quite logic-centered, in the 
sense that it allows that logics may contribute to inform, in a sense, the 
nature of a domain or context to which they are applied. This also means 
that a logic and a context are not independent entities, awaiting to be 
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matched. Rather, the logic somehow contributes to give a more specific 
shape and identity to the field of its own application. In more general terms, 
then, in the picture being proposed here, one needs an account of models 
that sees models as contributing actively to the character of the target they 
are intended to apply to. Typical accounts of models do not see models as 
having so much to offer on the way to individuate their targets or contexts 
of applications; rather, the typical accounts focus on the relation of models 
and targets, as two independent entities.   
 
This situation reflects itself in the fact that most accounts of the role of 
models are still very much focused on the representation relation. The plan 
is that there are models on the one side, and targets on the other, and that 
knowledge about the target is obtained when the models are properly 
related to their targets. These accounts all recognize the role of abstraction, 
idealization and simplifications, but still, this is not enough to precisely 
account for the epistemic role that models play in our scientific activities:  
 
Apart from simplifications, approximations and idealizations, 
scientific modelling involves significant conceptual work, 
which covers such epistemic activities as discerning specific 
types of phenomena, conceptualizing ‘non-directly observable’ 
objects, properties, or processes, and bringing phenomena 
under specific types of ‘non-empirical’ theoretical principles or 
concepts. It is difficult to see how these conceptual activities 
would fit into the traditional representational picture. 
(Knuuttila and Boon 2011, 313) 
 
That is, the traditional accounts (the ‘representational picture’ mentioned 
by Knuuttila and Boon) fall short of providing for a detailed enough picture 
of modeling. In particular, they fail to acknowledge the role of models in 
enabling the investigation of the target.  
 
Luckily, there are proposals in the literature on the use of models in science 
that bring the required constitutive-enabling relation of the models to their 
targets to the center of the stage. Here, we shall propose that one may adapt 
the ‘models as epistemic tools’, advanced by Knuuttila and Boon (2011) to 
the case of logic, and get a result that is quite connected with the proposal 
we have been describing for the localist picture in logic. This account of 
models allows that a model play an active role in individuating the context 
in which they apply to; modeling involves more than just matching a model 
and a preexisting target. Rather, the modeling activity has a creative part 
in enabling that one investigates the target, because the target only gets 
available in precise terms through the applications of the conceptual 
machinery provided by the model; models and their targets are, in a sense, 
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co-created. We see the target through the lenses of the model, as it were, 
and the justification of the model is partly built-in the model, given that the 
target is framed in theoretical language of the model too:5 
 
in this activity of modelling, the construction of models is 
intertwined with the construction of new phenomena, 
theoretical principles and scientific concepts. As a 
consequence, the justification of a model is partly built into it 
in the process of modelling, implying that the representational 
approach, despite its focus on justification, fails to pay enough 
attention on how models are justified in scientific practice. 
(Knuuttila and Boon 2011, 311) 
 
In the case of logics, as we have argued, use of a specific modeling of the 
inferences allowed enables the development of intuitionistic structures 
(and something similar may be said of classical mathematics, and 
inconsistent mathematics, with their respective logics). The justification 
for the use of a given logic is the fact that it is there to begin with, helping 
us to construct part of the phenomena to be accounted for; the models “both 
motivate and enable” the construction of the phenomena (Knuutila and 
Boon 2011, 317). The logics, understood as modeling kinds of inferences, 
motivate and enable the development of the mathematics associated with 
them. The same could also be said of classical mathematics, which, in the 
foundations period, needed to be put in firm basis, by following the 
standards of the newly developed classical logics. The individuation of the 
target depends in large measure of the logic used to model the inferences 
one is interested in. As it happens in science,  
 
modelling typically involves a theoretical (re)description of the 
target phenomenon as well as the development of theoretical 
principles and scientific concepts. The model in the process of 
its construction functions as an integrating tool as well as a 
scaffold for further scientific reasoning. In this way the model 
serves also as a tool of its own development. (Knuuttila and 
Boon 2011, 316) 
 
In this sense, the development of classical and intuitionistic logics explored 
the already available knowledge (the controversies on the validity of 
determined inferences, and the consequences of using only constructive 
inferences in proofs, for instance), to both be constructed and shape the 
field being modeled. That is, the model is not only a result of the data we 
 
5 The idea that models do incorporate ‘built-in’ justification for suiting their targets comes from 
Boumans (1999). 
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put in it, but also it helps us in interpreting and somehow shaping the data, 
enabling further investigation in terms of the model. This is what happens 
in classical and intuitionistic mathematics. This is what happens in 
classical and intuitionistic mathematics. Some of the inferences used in the 
mathematical practices of the end of the nineteenth century have led to 
constructions of distinct approaches to the legitimate reasoning in 
mathematics and, as a result, these advances have enabled the development 
of distinct mathematical practices itself. The model of inferences is what 
ends up constraining the development of the field of investigation. The 
model acts so that it works to delimit the field of application, its 
phenomena.  
 
Certainly, this only indicates in general lines how a ‘logic as models’ 
approach could go, but it does already give us a clear idea that the 
understanding of context we have suggested can be backed by an approach 
to models fine-tuned with the current understanding of models in science 
(being, thus, a naturalistic approach to the methodology of logic too). We 
suggest that a more pragmatic approach to models in science, which takes 
seriously the claim that the phenomena is theoretically laden, elaborated in 
theoretical terms furnished by the model, can have a lot of benefits for logic 
too. In particular, it can account for the fact that logics are used to generate 
a plurality of contexts, some of which may be of mathematical interest. 
Developing further the notion of logic as models in this specific approach 
is something we leave for some future work. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
We have suggested that Shapiro’s approach against a version of generalism 
in logic seems to face difficulties. We have identified that the major 
problem seems to be located in an ambiguity as to the role of logic in its 
relation to the domain or context where the logic is applied. Logic seems 
to be both used to characterize the context, and to be somehow extracted 
from the context. Our proposal to overcome the difficulty consists in 
locating logic right from the start as an ingredient constituting the domain 
or context. This makes full sense in the case of mathematical theories, at 
least as we now conceive of them (and we have discussed only the case of 
mathematical theories here). Not only does this dissolve the tensions in 
Shapiro’s approach, but also makes room for a more naturalistic approach 
to the philosophy of logic.  
 
As a by-product, we needed not to enter the discussion of how to grant that 
a given system is the correct choice for a given context, with disputes 
typically boiling down to issues of adequacy of systems of logic to the data. 
EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 2 | 2021      Article 2 
 26 
That is, we avoid the kind of discussion concerning whether a logic is right 
by relating a logic and a preexisting domain, both typically taken as being 
able to be characterized independently of each other. In our proposal, the 
correctness of a system is somehow built-in in the very context, and the 
idea that a context, which is gained so easily, deserves to be studied, 
depends on pragmatic factors; the decision on which systems are worth of 
study and development comes from science. Here, of course, Carnapian 
tolerance is playing a major role.  
 
Furthermore, this approach is nicely suited to the view of logic as models, 
when ‘models’ are understood in more naturalistic terms. The view of logic 
as modeling inferences, and the inferences modeled as delimiting and 
individuating the field where they apply squares nicely with the localist 
picture we have advanced. In fact, it boosts the localist proposal advanced 
here. Advocating a generalist picture, according to this view, would require 
that one adopts a restrictive position on the domains allowed for an 
investigation, a restrictive view that is not easy to justify, and that is not 
justified in the current state of the art of the logic and mathematics as we 
find it. In this sense, the view advanced here not only helps us advance a 
more coherent form of localism, but also provides for a clear picture of 
how new domains come to be proposed, such as paraconsistent 
mathematics, as we have argued. Certainly, more would still be required 
to articulate the proposal in all its details, and one may still draw many 
more important lessons for the epistemology of logic from the use of 
models in more naturalistic ways, as suggested by the ‘models as epistemic 
tools approach’, when connected to the ‘logic as models approach’, but we 
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